Fiduciary Voters? by Rave, D. Theodore




  What does the majority owe the minority when issues are put to a 
vote? This question is central to direct democracy, where voters bypass 
the legislature and enact law directly. Some scholars have argued that 
voters in direct democracy bear fiduciary-like duties because they act 
as representatives when casting their ballots. The Supreme Court, by 
contrast, has suggested that voters are not agents of the people and thus 
have no fiduciary obligation. By focusing on whether direct-democracy 
voters are representatives who bear duties, both sides have framed the 
issue incorrectly. They have imported a legal tool—fiduciary duty—
from private law designed to combat a governance problem absent 
from direct democracy: a principal–agent problem. 
  The real governance problem in direct democracy is the tyranny of 
the majority. Once we focus on the right problem, private law—
specifically corporate law—provides useful insights. Corporate law 
imposes duties—sometimes confusingly also called “fiduciary”—on 
shareholder majorities to consider minority interests when voting. 
Although these duties do not require the majority to subordinate its 
own interests like a true duty of loyalty, courts recognize the need to 
police for opportunism when the minority is vulnerable to exploitation. 
Looking to these private-law voter duties can help explain a puzzling 
line of Supreme Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of ballot 
initiatives that rolled back legislation benefitting minority groups. In 
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direct democracy, where structural protections for the minority are 
lacking, courts may be playing a familiar institutional role from 
corporate law: keeping the majority from exploiting the minority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What does the majority owe the minority when issues are put to a 
vote? In 2014, the Supreme Court faced that question in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN).1 Having 
failed to persuade their elected officials (and the Supreme Court in 
Grutter v. Bollinger2) to roll back affirmative action, a majority of 
Michigan voters took matters into their own hands. They used a ballot 
initiative to amend the state constitution to ban racial preferences in 
public education.3 Civil rights groups challenged the amendment on 
equal protection grounds. On one hand, as Justice Sotomayor argued 
 
 1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and 
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).  
 2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 3. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629 (plurality opinion). 
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in dissent, this looked like a power play by the voters in the majority. 
After losing in the legislative process, the majority used a majoritarian 
tool—a ballot initiative—to place decisions over a policy favored by 
minorities at a level of government where it is harder for minorities to 
win.4 On the other hand, as Justice Kennedy argued for the plurality, 
the voters merely took away a “grant of favored status” that the state 
had no obligation to extend in the first place.5 They resorted to direct 
democracy in order to “bypass public officials who were deemed not 
responsive to the concerns of a majority of the voters with respect to a 
policy of granting race-based preferences.”6 In upholding the 
amendment, the Court reasoned that prohibiting voters from making 
this sort of decision at a constitutional level because it affects a racial 
minority would almost be tantamount to giving the minority a right to 
leverage its minority status.7 
The debate in Schuette over whether the majority can restructure 
the political process in ways that disadvantage a racial minority is only 
one aspect of the complicated relationship between majorities and 
minorities more generally in a democracy. But it highlights a 
fundamental question for direct (as opposed to representative) 
democracy, some form of which is available in twenty-four states and 
more than half of American cities8: What do voters owe each other 
when issues are put to a vote? 
In 2013, the Supreme Court suggested that the answer is 
“nothing.” The Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry9 held that the voters 
who sponsored California’s ballot initiative banning same-sex marriage 
were “plainly not agents of the State” of California10 and did not owe 
 
 4. See id. at 1654, 1667–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 5. Id. at 1638 (plurality opinion). 
 6. Id. at 1636. 
 7. See id. at 1635 (explaining that those representing the interests of racial minority groups 
“could attempt to advance th[eir] aims by demanding an equal protection ruling that any number 
of matters be foreclosed from voter review or participation”). 
 8. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single 
Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 694 (2010). The umbrella term “direct democracy” 
includes both ballot initiatives, where citizens initiate the process by petitioning to place proposed 
legislation or state constitutional amendments directly on the ballot, and referenda, where the 
legislature refers a bill to the voters for ratification or rejection. Id. In this Article, I am focusing 
on the problems raised by, and duties of voters in, ballot initiatives, where voters make law 
directly without any input from the legislature. 
 9. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 10. Id. at 2666–67. 
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Californians any “fiduciary obligation.”11 These private parties thus 
lacked standing to defend the initiative’s constitutionality on appeal 
when state officials decided not to.12 Unlike California’s elected 
representatives—who are fiduciaries—the Court treated the 
proponents as ordinary voters who were free to pursue their own 
narrow interests without considering any impact on others.13 
Some legal scholars, by contrast, have recently argued that voters 
in direct democracy owe fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties to the public 
because they act in a “representative” capacity when they make law 
directly.14 They would, accordingly, require voters to vote in the 
interests of those they represent (whether conceived of as society as a 
whole or some smaller political community) and not in their own self-
interest.15 
The question I want to explore in this Article is whether it is 
appropriate or useful to think of voters in direct democracy as 
“fiduciaries.”16 So when, if ever, do voters owe duties to other voters 
or to the public as a whole? And if they do, what is the proper 
institutional and legal response? In trying to answer these questions, I 
 
 11. Id. at 2667 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 
2006))). 
 12. See id. at 2667–68. 
 13. Id. (implying that state officials have fiduciary obligations because, unlike private parties 
who “answer to no one,” state officials have been elected and have taken the oath of office). For 
an argument that elected representatives have fiduciary obligations to the people they represent, 
see D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 707–13 (2013). 
 14. See Edward B. Foley, Voters as Fiduciaries, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 153, 157–58, 181–82; 
Michael Serota & Ethan J. Leib, The Political Morality of Voting in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. 
L. REV. 1596, 1596, 1611–20 (2013).  
 15. See Foley, supra note 14, at 153, 162–63. Foley notes: 
Just as any other trustee breaches his or her fiduciary duty when using the trust’s assets 
to promote the trustee’s own personal self-interest, so too voters breach their fiduciary 
duties to society as a whole, present and future, if they exploit the electorate’s power 
over the assets of commonwealth to promote their own personal self-interest. 
Id. at 163; see also Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1596–98, 1605–11 (discussing the direct 
democracy voter’s authority to make binding law, which “establishes a structural relationship of 
political representation”).  
 16. Professor Edward Foley argues that voters are fiduciaries in both candidate elections and 
direct democracy. Foley, supra note 14, at 157–58. Professors Michael Serota and Ethan Leib, on 
the other hand, limit their claims about voter obligations to direct democracy. Serota & Leib, 
supra note 14, at 1596. In this Article, I want to set aside the question of whether voters in 
candidate elections are fiduciaries because, as Foley acknowledges, the argument for treating 
voters as fiduciaries when they make law directly is more straightforward than for treating them 
as fiduciaries when they delegate that task to legislators. See Foley, supra note 14, at 181–82. If 
voters are not fiduciary representatives in direct democracy, then a fortiori they are not fiduciary 
representatives in candidate elections. And candidate elections do not raise the distinctive risks 
of minority oppression that direct democracy presents. See infra Part I.B.  
RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2016  10:16 PM 
2016] FIDUCIARY VOTERS? 335 
look to several areas of private law as a guide because—though the 
tradition of fiduciary obligation in public law is long and 
distinguished17—the contours of, and justifications for, fiduciary duties 
are more fully worked out in private-law theory and doctrine. 
Additionally, private law can serve as a nice model for analyzing 
similarly structured governance problems in constitutional law because 
there is often an actual social contract instead of just a hypothetical 
one. 
By focusing on whether or not direct-democracy voters are 
representatives and thus bear corresponding fiduciary duties, both 
sides of this debate have framed the issue incorrectly. They have 
imported a legal tool from private law aimed at a governance problem 
that is absent from direct democracy. The classic role that fiduciary 
duties play in private-law representative relationships is to address a 
principal–agent problem. The fiduciary duty of loyalty aims to align the 
interests of an agent with those of the principal on whose behalf she 
acts (to minimize “agency costs,” in economic parlance).18 I will refer 
 
 17. E.g., J.W. GOUGH, Political Trusteeship, in JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136, 
183 (2d ed. 1973) (“[A] patriot king ‘will make one, and but one, distinction between his rights 
and those of his people: he will look on his to be a trust and theirs a property.’” (quoting Henry 
St. John Bollingbroke)); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 74, (J.W. Gough ed., Basil, Blackwell & Mott Ltd. 1948) 
(1690) (arguing that the legislative power “was only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends”). 
Professor Robert Natelson has chronicled the fiduciary views of the Framing generation. E.g., 
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1124–68 
(2004). For more contemporary work in this area, see generally EVAN FOX-DECENT, 
SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as 
Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 295 (2013); Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer From 
Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking 
Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441 (2010); Evan J. Criddle, 
Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); Paul Finn, Public 
Trust and Public Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224 (1994); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary 
Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEENS L.J. 259 (2005); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation 
of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 845 (2013); Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary 
Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415 (2014); Ethan J. Leib & Stephen 
R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820 (2016); Ethan J. Leib, 
David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2010); Donna M. Nagy, Owning Stock While Making Law: An Agency Problem 
and a Fiduciary Solution, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567 (2013); David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, 
Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249 (2011). 
 18. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 980–82 (2013); 
cf. Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 517–
RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2016  10:16 PM 
336 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:331 
to this classic form of fiduciary duty as an “agent-to-principal duty.” In 
direct democracy, however, there is no representative relationship—
no clear principal or agent—to trigger such fiduciary duties. The whole 
point of direct democracy is to eliminate the principal–agent problem 
inherent in political representation. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth seemed 
too quick to relieve voters of any obligation simply because they did 
not meet the requirements of the Restatement (Third) of Agency19—an 
oddly narrow criterion given the diversity of fiduciary relationships in 
private law. The absence of a principal–agent problem does not 
necessarily mean that voters have no duties. In several contexts, private 
law imposes duties—which are sometimes confusingly also called 
“fiduciary”—on voters outside any representative relationship. For 
example, majority shareholders owe duties to the minority when voting 
on a corporate freezeout merger.20 Similar duties crop up in votes on 
private bond restructurings and oil and gas unitization.21 But these 
duties—which I will refer to as “principal-to-principal duties”—are not 
aimed at controlling agency costs. They are aimed at a different 
governance problem: preventing the majority from oppressing the 
minority. And this problem is of particular concern in direct 
democracy, which lacks many of the structural features that protect and 
empower minorities in representative democracy. 
Once we are focused on the right governance problem—the 
tyranny of the majority—looking at the principal-to-principal duties 
that private law places on voters can help us better understand 
approaches to the same type of problem in direct democracy, whether 
or not those duties are properly termed “fiduciary.” 
Private law recognizes the tension between voters’ rights to 
“selfish ownership” and the risk that the majority may use its power 
vis-à-vis the minority to opportunistically direct disproportionate 
 
18 (2015) (arguing that fiduciaries may be charged with pursuing “purposes” and not only the 
interests of persons). 
 19. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013) (explaining that the basic 
features of an agency relationship were missing). 
 20. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (concluding that the 
merger did not meet the requisite standard of fairness because “[m]aterial information, necessary 
to acquaint those shareholders with the bargaining positions of [the merging companies], was 
withheld under circumstances amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty”). 
 21. See, e.g., Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 112–14 (2d 
Cir. 1896); Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 105 P.3d 1269, 1282 (Kan. 2005). 
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benefits to itself at the minority’s expense.22 For investors to be willing 
to commit their capital to a venture governed by majority rule, there 
must be some assurance to those who may find themselves in the 
minority that they will not be exploited when they are outvoted. And 
that role has largely fallen to courts. Thus we can see an equitable 
streak running through diverse areas of private law where courts step 
in to enforce duties running from the majority to the minority when 
issues are put to a vote, not because of any representative relationship, 
but rather as a corollary to the use of voting to overcome a collective-
action problem.23 
But what is the content of these principal-to-principal duties? 
Teasing this out is important because courts often use “fiduciary” 
language loosely without being precise about the governance problem 
they are addressing or the scope of the duty they are imposing. As I 
explain below in a novel taxonomy, potential voter duties can be 
mapped onto a spectrum ranging from purely self-interested voting to 
weak and strong forms of equitable antiexploitation obligations to a 
“true” fiduciary duty of loyalty.24 The trend in private law is to stay 
away from the poles. Even where parties could have protected 
themselves through ex ante contracting, courts are reluctant to stand 
aside when the majority acts opportunistically toward the minority. But 
on the other end, although courts sometimes use the language of 
“fiduciary duty” in describing the majority’s obligations toward the 
minority, they do not tend to impose the full brunt of the true fiduciary 
duty of loyalty; the majority need not subordinate its own interests to 
those of the minority in the way an agent would to a principal. Instead, 
courts tend to enforce a good-faith duty not to oppress or exploit the 
minority. Although the precise content of this duty may be hard to 
specify, the important part is that courts recognize the need to police 
for opportunism ex post when the minority is vulnerable to the 
majority. 
 
 22. E.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (“The 
majority, concededly, have certain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the 
corporation which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obligation to the 
minority.”). 
 23. I focus primarily on corporate law because it is the area where this case law is most 
developed, but courts exhibit a similar institutional response in many areas of private law where 
they are tasked with overseeing long-term relational contracting. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1618, 1621 (1989). 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
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Turning back to public law, the equitable role that private-law 
courts play in policing for opportunism when an issue is put to a vote 
can be a useful lens for understanding the Supreme Court’s sometimes 
puzzling approach to equal protection in direct democracy. As Justice 
Thomas recently noted in his dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,25 the Court has been 
all over the map when it comes to direct democracy, sometimes 
“offer[ing] a paean to the ballot initiative” and other times treating 
ballot initiatives with “disdain.”26 But perhaps private law can be a 
guide for understanding (and evaluating) the intuition behind the 
Court’s approach to direct democracy in cases ranging from Romer v. 
Evans,27 which struck down a ballot initiative barring claims of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, to Schuette, which 
upheld an initiative banning affirmative action.28 
The Court does not seem to treat voters as fiduciaries in the classic 
sense when it reviews the output of ballot initiatives; it does not require 
the majority to put the minority’s interests ahead of its own. But it does 
not seem to take a hands-off, no-duty approach either. Instead, the 
Court may be filling the same institutional role in reviewing the output 
of direct democracy as the courts play in reviewing votes in private 
law—policing for minority exploitation and acting as an equitable 
brake on majoritarian excess where the structural protections for the 
minority are weakest. 
Part I of this Article explores the governance problem in direct 
democracy. Although direct democracy eliminates the principal–agent 
problem—the primary justification for fiduciary duties in private law—
by allowing voters to make law directly, it leaves minorities particularly 
vulnerable to exploitation. Part II then looks at the duties of voters in 
private law, with a particular focus on the relationship between 
majorities and minorities in closely held corporations, and maps 
potential voter duties onto a spectrum. As I explain below, the law 
governing closely held corporations is a useful lens for analyzing 
minority vulnerability in direct democracy because several structural 
features of direct democracy are—perhaps surprisingly—more 
analogous to closely held corporations than publicly traded ones. Part 
 
 25. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 26. Id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 27. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 28. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1639 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
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III turns back to public law and uses these private-law approaches to 
try to better understand the intuitions behind the Supreme Court’s 
approach to equal protection in direct democracy. Part IV addresses 
some potential objections and disanalogies. 
I.  THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM IN DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
James Madison identified two governance challenges for any 
democracy: First, it must control the “mischiefs of faction”; that is, it 
must prevent a majority of the people from ganging up on the minority 
and opportunistically directing benefits to themselves at the minority’s 
expense.29 Second, it must ensure the loyalty of the rulers to those they 
rule; in other words, it must address the principal–agent problem that 
arises when the representatives who are chosen to govern might pursue 
their own interests instead of the interests of the people who put them 
in office (let alone the ones who voted against them).30 In direct 
democracy, the second concern is inapplicable—there are no 
representatives31—but, as Madison warned in Federalist 10, the first 
concern about the tyranny of the majority is acute. 
A. Voters Are Principals, Not Agents 
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s apparent position that voters 
have no fiduciary duties in ballot initiatives, some scholars have argued 
that direct-democracy voters owe fiduciary or fiduciary-like duties to 
the public when they vote. As the following discussion indicates, 
however, the duties that these scholars advocate are designed to 
combat a principal–agent problem and do not fit well when applied to 
direct-democracy voters, who are not agents, but principals. 
For example, Professors Michael Serota and Ethan Leib argue 
that voters in ballot initiatives (though not candidate elections) act in 
a “representative” capacity because the product of their vote is 
 
 29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke, ed., 1982). 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 350–51 (James Madison). 
 31. Indeed, direct democracy can actually be an effective tool for dealing with problems of 
incumbent self-dealing in representative democracy. One need not look further than states like 
California and Arizona’s use of ballot initiatives to take the task of drawing legislative districts 
out of the hands of the legislators who will run for reelection in those districts. See Rave, supra 
note 13, at 730–35; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redstricting Comm’n, 135 S. 
Ct. 2652, 2675–77 (2015) (upholding an independent redistricting commission created by ballot 
initiative). 
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coercive law that binds other citizens.32 Accordingly, Serota and Leib 
say, voters in direct democracy bear a duty “to pursue vigorously the 
interests of the represented and refuse to self-deal”—an agent-to-
principal duty that sounds almost fiduciary in nature.33 Although they 
are careful to limit their claim to a moral obligation, not a legally 
enforceable one, they would require direct-democracy voters to vote 
in pursuit of a credible and good-faith conception of the public interest, 
not their own private interests.34 
Professor Edward Foley goes even further. He argues that voters 
are in fact fiduciaries, not only in direct democracy, but in all 
elections.35 Foley claims that voters “represent, not themselves, but the 
totality of residents in their community,”36 and thus bear a fiduciary 
duty to act “on behalf of society as a whole, both now and into the 
future”37 when they make law directly through ballot initiatives and 
also when they elect legislators to make law.38 
Foley and Serota and Leib derive their duties from direct-
democracy voters’ position in a “structural relationship of political 
representation” and, in doing so, describe duties that are aimed at 
solving a principal–agent problem.39 But it is difficult to see whom 
voters represent when they vote in a plebiscite (let alone in a candidate 
election where the voters are deciding who should represent them). 
When citizens can vote directly on a particular issue (instead of 
delegating that task to legislators), it is not clear how voters act on 
behalf of or “represent” anyone but themselves. In other words, there 
is no obvious principal or agent. 
Serota and Leib suggest that voters act on behalf of nonvoters—
“the too-young, too-infirm, too-lazy, and too-felonious”40—but that 
 
 32. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1596–98, 1603–11; see also id. at 1611 n.53 (equating 
“voters acting in direct democracy” with “[agents] acting on behalf of others”).  
 33. Id. at 1611. Serota and Leib have elsewhere described the requirements of the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty as follows: “The fiduciary is prohibited from self-dealing and is required to pursue 
the interests of her beneficiary above her own.” Ethan J. Leib, Michael Serota & David L. Ponet, 
Fiduciary Principles and the Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109, 1135 (2014). 
 34. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1598, 1612–13. 
 35. Foley, supra note 14, at 153, 160–63. 
 36. Id. at 153. 
 37. Id. at 183.  
 38. Id. at 157–58, 162–63, 175–82. 
 39. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1605; see Foley, supra note 14, at 158 n.16. 
 40. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1605. Children may present a special case, and it is not 
implausible to think that they are virtually represented by citizens who are old enough to vote. 
But very often children will have actual representatives—their parents—who act as recognized 
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idea seems quite close to discarded notions of virtual representation 
(that is, that white male property owners acted on behalf of nonvoting 
women, slaves, and tenants). “[M]ore important[ly],” Serota and Leib 
argue, “the winners must represent the losers.”41 But on a fundamental 
level, it is difficult to see how such a form of representation could work 
in a plebiscite, where a single issue is put to a one-time vote. The 
interests of the winners and losers on that issue and at that moment are 
diametrically opposed. How could the winners faithfully represent the 
losers in the very act of expressing their opposing interests through 
voting?42  
Foley is not precise on the issue of whom voters are supposed to 
represent. At times he suggests that it is “the totality of residents in 
their community,”43 and at other times it is “society as a whole, present 
and future.”44 But simply defining the beneficiary of voters’ fiduciary 
duties as “society as a whole” cannot solve the problem. Unless 
 
(though perhaps sui generis) fiduciaries on their behalf and accordingly should take their interests 
into account when voting. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 
81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2401–03 (1995). 
 41. Serota & Leib, supra note 14, at 1605.  
 42. This issue has been well ventilated in class action law. The same type of problem arises 
when one plaintiff seeks to represent a larger class, but we worry that a collective choice (for 
example, to accept a group settlement) will be imposed upon class members with divergent 
interests in a single-shot transaction. Class action law solves this problem, not by saying that class 
members with one set of interests represent those with divergent interests, but by defining the 
class such that interests are aligned class-wide. See, e.g., Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 625–26 (1997); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–42 (1940). Such an alignment is not an 
option in a plebiscite. Madison recognized as much in Federalist 10. He said that one way to cure 
the mischiefs of faction would be to give everyone the same interests; but that, of course, is 
impossible in a polity. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 58 (James Madison). 
 43. Foley, supra note 14, at 153.  
 44. Id. at 162–63, 188. This imprecision leads to confusion when Foley talks about the 
implications of his voters-as-fiduciaries approach for the issue the Supreme Court considered in 
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016): whether legislative districts should be drawn to equalize 
total population or number of voters. Foley, supra note 14, at 187–90. If voters represent “the 
totality of residents in their community,” id. at 153, then districting by total population (Foley’s 
preferred course) makes sense. Each resident will have equal “say” in the legislature through his 
or her (virtual) representatives—the fiduciary voters. If, on the other hand, voters represent 
“society as a whole,” id. at 162–63, then geographical districting does not matter because voters 
will have no allegiance to their districts. If we are going to have districts, then it actually seems 
like they should be drawn to equalize voters, not population, so that all voters will have an equal 
chance to exercise their fiduciary obligation to get their view of the public good enacted and to 
take maximum advantage of “crowdsourcing” (that is, the Condorcet Jury Theorem) in 
determining what that good is. Cf. id. at 179–80. The Court in Evenwel ultimately decided that 
states are permitted to draw districts to equalize total population without deciding whether that 
is the only permissible basis for apportionment. See Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1132–33. 
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interests are uniform across society, there will always be winners and 
losers in a vote. 
Perhaps more importantly, the types of duties these scholars 
describe are aimed at a principal–agent problem and are not well suited 
to the act of voting among principals. The core of this classic form of 
fiduciary duty (the agent-to-principal duty) is the duty of loyalty, which 
requires the fiduciary to act for the exclusive benefit of the 
beneficiary—to put the beneficiary’s interests ahead of his own.45 But 
the law does not trust the fiduciary to do that when his own interests 
are at stake, so fiduciary law adopts a prophylactic rule against self-
dealing: the fiduciary must avoid situations where his interests conflict 
with the beneficiary’s (or be prepared to defend the fairness of the 
dealing before a skeptical court).46 The point is to eliminate, or at least 
minimize, situations where the interests of the fiduciary diverge from 
the interests of the beneficiary—to maximize the agent’s faithfulness 
to the principal he represents. 
These agent-to-principal fiduciary duties do not fit well in the 
absence of any obvious representative relationship. They are designed 
to regulate the relationship between principals and agents, not 
interactions among voters, who are all principals themselves. Thus 
their tools make little sense in the voting context, where the sorts of 
conflicts of interest that those prophylactic rules are designed to 
prevent are inherent. Trying to impose a true fiduciary duty of loyalty 
on voters would be to ask them to act selflessly in the very type of 
situation where fiduciary law does not trust fiduciaries. 
The Supreme Court was right in Hollingsworth: voters are not 
agents of the people. But that does not necessarily mean that direct-
democracy voters have no duties. It simply means that the discussion 
of direct-democracy voters’ duties to date has focused on the wrong 
governance problem. The governance problem in direct democracy is 
not a principal–agent problem that can be addressed through a 
conventional fiduciary duty of loyalty. Instead, it is a tyranny-of-the-
majority problem. 
 
 45. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
595, 601–02 (1997); Miller, supra note 18, at 976.  
 46. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (“[A] fiduciary owes a 
duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . . 
[This] requir[es] avoidance of situations in which a fiduciary’s personal interest possibly conflicts 
with the interest of those owed a fiduciary duty.” (citations omitted)). 
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B. The Plight of the Minority 
Direct democracy is ripe for minority exploitation because it lacks 
many of the structural protections for minorities that are built into a 
representative democracy (about which Madison waxed so eloquently 
in Federalist 10).47 At least four features of representative democracy 
that minorities depend on for protection are lacking in direct 
democracy: intermediation, veto points, deliberation, and repeat play. 
First, minorities cannot depend on the intermediation of 
representatives with (even judicially unenforced) fiduciary duties 
running to the polity as a whole.48 In a ballot initiative, there is no 
opportunity, in Madison’s words, “to refine and enlarge the public 
views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of 
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to 
sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.”49 Instead the voters 
act directly. 
Second, direct democracy lacks the various veto points that a 
system of divided power creates (such as bicameralism, the presidential 
veto, federalism, and the filibuster), which can sometimes give 
minorities effective control, or at least significant leverage, over a 
decision.50 A minority group need only control one of these levers to 
block, or extract concessions for, disadvantageous legislation, even if it 
 
 47. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 
54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (1978); Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 295–97; Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE 
L.J. 1503, 1522–30 (1990); see also Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & 
Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 
(2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[W]ithout checks, democratically approved legislation can 
oppress minority groups.”). Political scientists have demonstrated that racial, ethnic, and sexual 
minorities have fared poorly in direct democracy. See, e.g., Todd Donovan, Direct Democracy and 
Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730, 1743–45 (2013); Barbara S. Gamble, 
Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 262 (1997); Donald P. Haider-
Markel, Alana Querze & Kara Lindaman, Lose, Win, or Draw?: A Reexamination of Direct 
Democracy and Minority Rights, 60 POL. RES. Q. 304, 307 (2007); cf. Todd Donovan & Shaun 
Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: An Extension, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1020, 1023–24 
(1998) (arguing that minority oppression stemming from direct democracy is more prevalent in 
smaller jurisdictions and may go away as size increases). But see Zoltan L. Hajnal, Elisabeth R. 
Gerber & Hugh Louch, Minorities and Direct Legislation: Evidence from California Ballot 
Proposition Elections, 64 J. POL. 154, 169–70 (2002) (finding that minorities are usually on the 
winning side of initiatives, except when those initiatives explicitly target minority rights).  
 48. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1526–27; Rave, supra note 13, at 706–22 (arguing that political 
representatives owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to voters, though it often goes unenforced). 
 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 62 (James Madison). 
 50. See Bell, supra note 47, at 14; Eule, supra note 47, at 1557–58. 
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does not have the votes to run the same gauntlet with its own policies. 
In a ballot initiative, by contrast, a bare majority wins. 
Third, in modern ballot initiatives, there is less opportunity for the 
minority to persuade the majority through deliberation.51 After all, the 
voters cannot all get together in a room to discuss the issue before the 
vote.52 And the quality of mass discourse, through advertising and 
sound bites aimed at harried voters with many other things on their 
minds, can leave much to be desired from a deliberative standpoint. As 
Professor Lawrence Sager put it, “Legislation by plebiscite is not and 
cannot be a deliberative process.”53 
Fourth—and perhaps most importantly—votes on ballot 
initiatives are single-shot transactions, so minorities cannot protect 
themselves through logrolling or coalition building.54 Without repeat 
play, minorities cannot trade their support on a number of broader 
measures toward which they are relatively indifferent for others’ 
support on the few issues that are most critical to the minority. 
Effective vote trading requires a series of votes over time among repeat 
players with the opportunity to build up enough trust to be confident 
that the counterparties will be there when the time comes and to punish 
them later if they defect. In that sort of environment (for example, in a 
legislature), a cohesive minority can do quite well by building up 
political capital through bargains and spending it to make sure its most 
critical issues are taken care of.55 A plebiscite, by contrast, is just a one-
time, up-or-down vote on a single issue. 
 
 51. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1527 (“In contrast [to direct democracy], the deliberative 
process offers time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occasions for transforming 
preferences.”); Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 
903, 911 (2006) (“[D]irect democracy’s reliance on ‘naked’ preferences is potentially troublesome 
because it makes little effort to educate citizens on the issues upon which they are voting and 
gives them no well-suited forum to deliberate about those issues.”). 
 52. The same might not have been true of ancient Greek city-states or New England town 
meetings. 
 53. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake 
v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (1978). But see Leib, supra note 51, 
at 914 (laying out a proposal for making direct democracy more deliberative through a “popular 
branch of government”). 
 54. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1527, 1556–58; Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and 
Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. REV. 625, 636, 667–68 (1994).  
 55. This is a central insight of public-choice theory. See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 213–16, 220–22 (1962). Note that there is no guarantee that 
minorities will do better in representative democracy, though public-choice theory tends to 
predict that they will. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 723–24 (1985). Minorities may be the victims of majority logrolls and even with repeat 
RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2016  10:16 PM 
2016] FIDUCIARY VOTERS? 345 
Further, state laws regulating direct democracy have certain 
features that exacerbate the risk of minority exploitation. Single-
subject rules prevent even less effective attempts at logrolling.56 In 
theory, even without repeat play, one minority group could cut a deal 
with others to combine unrelated issues into a single omnibus ballot 
initiative, which could pass with their combined support.57 But the laws 
of most states take away even this more limited opportunity for 
logrolling by restricting ballot initiatives to a single subject.58 And this 
focus on a single issue may also serve to create cohesion among a 
majority faction even when its preferences on that particular issue are 
not strongly held. 
Similarly, the use of secret ballots in direct democracy makes it 
difficult to monitor or enforce any sort of political bargain over time; 
voters cannot punish each other for defecting.59 And, knowing that 
their votes are secret, voters may feel freer to vote on their baser 
impulses.60 At the same time, voters in direct democracy often lack 
adequate information or signals from moderating intermediaries like 
political parties on the issues they are asked to decide, and they, quite 
rationally, fail to invest in obtaining that information.61 
Finally, the minority typically lacks an easy exit option.62 Unlike, 
say, minority shareholders in a publicly traded corporation, voters 
dissatisfied with the outcome of a ballot initiative cannot simply sell 
their shares. Their only choice is to pick up and move. Although some 
 
play might not have enough political capital to trade to protect their interests. See Michael D. 
Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 835–36 (2006). 
And discrete and insular minorities might be unable to find allies due to irrational prejudice. See 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 (1980). But minorities are 
undoubtedly more vulnerable in direct democracy, where bargaining is not possible. 
 56. See Gilbert, supra note 55, at 858; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the 
Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 957–59 (1983). 
 57. See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 8, at 700.  
 58. See id. at 689. Cooter and Gilbert caution that this form of logrolling through omnibus 
ballot initiatives can be even more harmful to minorities who have no opportunity to bargain with 
the majority not to pass it, no matter how much harm it does to them. Id. at 689, 700 n.60. 
 59. See id. at 701–03. 
 60. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 47, at 14–15; Eule, supra note 47, at 1556. 
 61. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 47, at 1557; Jonathan R. Macey, The Role of the Democratic 
and Republican Parties as Organizers of Shadow Interest Groups, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23–24 
(1990). For a discussion of the role of intermediary institutions, see Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel 
R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999). 
 62. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN 
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 17 (1970). 
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degree of sorting is, of course, possible as people move to localities 
where neighbors share their preferences,63 moving to a different 
jurisdiction may entail significant costs that the minority is unwilling or 
unable to bear.64 In short, the minority is very vulnerable to the 
majority. 
This is not to say that the vulnerability of minorities makes direct 
democracy an anathema. The whole point is that it is a majoritarian 
institution.65 Direct democracy empowers the majority to break the 
hold of powerful cohesive minorities that might capture the legislative 
process. And it can serve as an important check on unfaithful agents 
who may manage to ignore the majority will by either catering to 
powerful minorities in a series of bargains that are obscured to the 
voters66 or, worse, manipulating the laws governing the political 
process to entrench themselves.67 It was only through the ballot 
initiative, for example, that voters in California and Arizona were able 
to limit gerrymandering by taking the power to draw legislative 
 
 63. See William A. Fischel, Public Goods and Property Rights: Of Coase, Tiebout, and Just 
Compensation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 343, 347–48 (Terry 
L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 419 (1956). 
 64. See, e.g., David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY 
LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 147, 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1748) (“Can we seriously 
say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign 
language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires?”).  
 65. Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 57, at 702 (“A primary purpose of direct democracy is to 
ascertain the [majority] will of the people.”); see also Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and 
Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707, 712 (1992) (“By 
definition, a minority group will not itself have enough plebiscite votes either to pass laws that 
would advantage it or to stop legislation that would disadvantage it.”). 
 66. See Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 57, at 699; cf. Kellen Zale, Changing the Plan: The 
Challenge of Applying Environmental Review to Land Use Initiatives, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 866–
67 (2013) (discussing how land-use initiatives can serve as a structural counterbalance to 
prodevelopment special interests in cities). 
 67. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups 
of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 712 (1998); see also BRUCE E. CAIN, 
DEMOCRACY MORE OR LESS: AMERICA’S POLITICAL REFORM QUANDARY 25–29 (2015) 
(discussing the value of pluralism in political mechanisms and reform). Even Professor Bruce 
Cain, who is generally skeptical of direct democracy where it can trump the legislature through 
constitutional amendments, explains that “if the direct popular initiative is to have a role, it should 
be limited to reforms where elected official[s] have a conflict of interest and decided by 
supermajority rules.” CAIN, supra, at 210. 
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districts out of the hands of self-interested incumbent legislators and 
creating independent redistricting commissions.68 
Madison’s governance concerns are interrelated, and there is an 
inherent tradeoff in choosing direct or representative democracy. The 
structural features of the legislative process designed to protect 
minorities also enable minorities to capture the process and insulate 
representatives from accountability to the majority. And the features 
of direct democracy that can break this stranglehold come at a risk to 
minorities, who have no opportunity to bargain and logroll to protect 
their interests. 
II.  FIDUCIARY(?) DUTIES OF VOTERS IN PRIVATE LAW 
Several areas of private law recognize that minorities are 
vulnerable when decisions are put to a vote. In corporate law, for 
example, there is a strong norm of majority rule.69 Yet corporate law 
recognizes a tension between the rights of majority shareholders to 
pursue its own selfish interests70 and the risk that the majority will use 
their control over corporate affairs to gain disproportionate benefits at 
the expense of the minority.71 And in some circumstances, corporate 
law recognizes a duty running from the majority to the minority—a 
principal-to-principal duty. For example, a majority shareholder with 
the ability to control the outcome of a shareholder vote cannot use a 
merger, sale of assets, dissolution, or reverse stock split to “squeeze 
out” the minority for less than the fair value of its shares.72 
 
 68. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1 (amended by Ariz. Proposition 106 (2000)); CAL. CONST. 
art. XXI (amended by Cal. Proposition 11 (2008) and Cal. Proposition 20 (2010)); see also Rave, 
supra note 13, at 730–32 (discussing the Arizona and California commissions).  
 69. See DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 
§ 7.01[B][1], Lexis Advance (database updated 2015). 
 70. E.g., Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 437, 444 (Del. 1996) (noting that the 
controlling shareholders “were entitled to pursue their own interests in voting their shares” and 
acknowledging “their entitlement as shareholders to act in their self-interest”); see also Ringling 
Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947) (“Generally 
speaking, a shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting, and it is 
not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit, or determined by whims or 
caprice . . . .”); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 598 (Del. Ch. 1986) (observing 
that the law “does not . . . require . . . controlling shareholders [to] sacrifice their own financial 
interest in the enterprise for the sake of the corporation or its minority shareholders”). 
 71. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).  
 72. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983); Coggins v. New 
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1117–18 (Mass. 1986); Grato v. Grato, 639 
A.2d 390, 397–98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
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Likewise, in partnerships, most day-to-day decisions are governed 
by majority rule.73 But that arrangement leaves minority partners 
vulnerable, particularly given that partners (unlike corporate 
shareholders) are not protected by limited liability; they are personally 
responsible for all partnership debts incurred at the majority’s 
direction.74 As a result, partners are fiduciaries, not only for the 
partnership, but also for each other, and are required at all times to act 
in good faith toward each other.75 
Courts have recognized similar principal-to-principal duties when 
a majority of bondholders vote under a collective-action clause to 
“cram down” a debt-restructuring plan over the objection of a 
minority.76 In order to facilitate restructuring when a debtor becomes 
insolvent (which could leave both debtor and creditors better off than 
a default), some bond contracts allow a majority of bondholders to 
agree to postpone payments or reduce the principal on all of the bonds, 
even those held by dissenters, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
holdouts wrecking the deal. But because of the risk that the majority 
will collude with the debtor to direct disproportionate benefits to itself 
at the minority’s expense, courts have conditioned enforcement of 
these clauses on the majority’s compliance with an intercreditor duty 
of “utmost good faith.”77 
We can see a similar move in compulsory oil and gas unitization, 
where property owners can be compelled by majority vote to 
participate in joint operations to extract oil and gas from a common 
reservoir in the hopes of reducing waste and increasing total 
production.78 But enforcement of the unitization plan is conditioned on 
 
 73. E.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1997). 
 74. Id. § 306(a). 
 75. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928); see also UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 
supra note 73, § 404(a)–(d) (listing partners’ duties). 
 76. William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of 
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds 
and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1336–37 (2002). 
 77. Hackettstown Nat’l Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co., 74 F. 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1896); 
see, e.g., Sage v. Cent. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 334, 341 (1879); Redwood Master Fund Ltd. v. TD Bank 
Eur. Ltd. [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2703, [105] (Eng.). For a more detailed discussion, see D. Theodore 
Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1235–38 
(2013). 
 78. Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property 
Rights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589, 596 (2002). 
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the good faith of the majority and fair and equitable treatment of the 
minority in allocating the proceeds from the joint operation.79 
In short, there is an equitable streak running through diverse areas 
of private law requiring the majority to treat the minority “fairly” when 
an issue is put to a vote. The majority’s principal-to-principal duty is 
sometimes called “fiduciary,”80 but its justification differs from the 
agent-to-principal duty in quintessentially fiduciary relationships. 
A. The Source of Private-Law Voter Duties 
“True” fiduciary duties, like the duty of loyalty, are a tool (one of 
many) to control agency costs in principal–agent relationships.81 The 
duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to subordinate his or her interests 
to the beneficiary’s, and it is typically enforced through prophylactic 
rules against self-dealing.82 But the majority’s duty in the examples 
above is not aimed at aligning the interests of the majority with those 
of the minority and ensuring that the majority faithfully executes the 
minority’s wishes. In other words, it is not aimed at a principal–agent 
problem. 
Instead, the majority’s duty is a corollary to the use of voting to 
solve a collective-action problem. Running a corporation, a 
partnership, or even a debt restructuring by unanimous consent leaves 
the collective vulnerable to strategic holdouts, who can threaten to 
block beneficial actions unless they are paid off. Adopting a majority 
voting rule disables would-be holdouts, but, at the same time, it leaves 
the minority vulnerable to the majority. After all, the power to hold 
out is the power to avoid exploitation.83 
This is a distinct governance problem. By placing principal-to-
principal duties on majority voters, the law aims to reassure individuals 
who, in search of joint gains, surrender their autonomy to joint 
 
 79. E.g., Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 105 P.3d 1269, 1282 (Kan. 2005) (recognizing 
a state law requiring courts to ensure “that the [compulsory unitization] is fair and equitable to 
all interest owners.” (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1304(c) (2003))). 
 80. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. So is a 
dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders.” (citations omitted)); Perlman v. 
Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955); see also MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 6.07[A] 
(“[T]he duties owed by a controlling shareholder are typically characterized as ‘fiduciary’ in 
nature . . . .”). 
 81. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 18, at 981. 
 82. See id. at 983 (“In fiduciary law . . . it is assumed that the parties are interacting for the 
exclusive benefit of . . . the beneficiary.”); Miller & Gold, supra note 18, at 547. 
 83. See Rave, supra note 77, at 1213–19. 
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decisionmaking processes that they will not be exploited if they are 
outvoted.84 The majority’s duty is what the minority demands in 
exchange for leaving itself vulnerable to a majority vote. It is the 
minority’s assurance against a tyranny of the majority. Indeed, as 
Professor John Coffee has explained, as corporate law shifted away 
from unanimity requirements for fundamental corporate changes in 
the nineteenth century and toward majority rule, shareholders’ ability 
to protect themselves from exploitation by holding out “was replaced 
by the idea that those controlling the corporation owed a duty of 
fairness to the minority.”85 
The source of this duty is thus fundamentally contractarian. As 
one court put it in the corporate context, there is an implicit term in the 
corporate contract “that corporate machinery may not be manipulated 
so as to injure minority stockholders.”86 But because the costs of 
contractual specificity are high—it is hard at the time the cooperative 
venture is formed to anticipate all of the creative means by which the 
majority might take advantage of the minority—the law supplies 
default terms.87 
Courts play an important institutional role in this story. When the 
voters’ “social contract” (for example, the corporate charter, 
partnership agreement, or bond contract) is incomplete, it effectively 
delegates to courts the role of policing for opportunism. Indeed, as 
Coffee has argued, what matters most in corporate law “is not the 
specific substantive content of any rule, but rather the institution of 
 
 84. See id. at 1215–19, 1234. 
 85. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1635. The dissenting shareholder’s right of appraisal, which, 
under certain circumstances, allows shareholders to force the corporation to buy back their shares 
at a judicially determined “fair value,” also arose in response to minority vulnerability when state 
legislatures amended the rules to allow fundamental corporate changes to go forward on less than 
unanimous consent. See, e.g., Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535–36 (1941) 
(recounting the history of the Ohio statute); William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, 
Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 81–82 (recounting 
shifts in American law). 
 86. Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch. 1967). 
 87. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 283 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations]; cf. 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 
445 (1993) (explaining how establishing default rules can reduce transaction costs). Even if private 
parties can contract around default rules imposing duties on the majority, the content of those 
default rules tells us something important. Presumably the default rules are set to reflect the terms 
to which most parties would agree most of the time (thus minimizing transaction costs because 
few parties would want to depart from them). See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of 
Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1087–88 
(1983). Thus they are the implicit terms of a contract when the contract is silent on those points. 
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judicial oversight.”88 Coffee explains that in any form of long-term 
relational contracting (such as a corporation) the parties know that 
disagreements will inevitably arise.89 Seeing as they cannot possibly 
anticipate and provide for all of them in advance, they specify a 
governance mechanism to resolve future disputes, subject to some 
judicial oversight ex post.90 The hope, of course, is that the governance 
mechanism (whether it is majority rule, board authority, or something 
else) will determine the best course of action; it is not always clear what 
is in the collective interest, and courts are not necessarily the best 
institutions to figure it out.91 But any governance mechanism has its 
weaknesses, and corporate law critically depends on courts ex post to 
ensure that all parties continue to act in good faith, not 
opportunistically, when using that mechanism.92 Courts recognize this 
intuitively.93 Thus it is no surprise that, across a broad range of private-
law contexts where voting is used to resolve disagreements and 
facilitate collective action, courts recognize that voters have some 
duties to their fellow voters, and step in to prevent one side “from 
taking ‘opportunistic’ advantage of the other.”94 
B. The Content of Private-Law Voter Duties 
It is clear that voters in the majority owe some sort of duty to the 
minority across a wide range of private-law contexts. But what is the 
content of this duty? Unfortunately, this area is plagued by linguistic 
imprecision that can conflate the tyranny-of-the-majority problem with 
the principal–agent problem. Courts often use “fiduciary” language 
loosely and are not always clear about which of the two governance 
 
 88. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621. 
 89. Id. at 1681. 
 90. Id. 
 91. This relative lack of institutional competence is a motivation for the business judgment 
rule. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986); 
D. Theodore Rave, Institutional Competence in Fiduciary Government, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew S. Gold & D. Gordon Smith eds.) (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 5–6) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 92. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621, 1681. 
 93. Even in limited liabilities companies (LLCs), which allow far more flexibility for parties 
to contract around default rules (even the duty of loyalty), courts see a role for themselves 
policing for opportunism ex post. See, e.g., Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. Ne. Am. Baseball, 
Inc. (In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422, 461–62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007); VGS, Inc. 
v. Castiel, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000); Anderson v. Wilder, 
No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003). 
 94. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621. 
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problems they are addressing. In what follows, I attempt to tease out 
what courts mean when they impose duties on voters. For simplicity’s 
sake I focus on examples from corporate law (particularly cases 
involving closely held corporations), but the analytical framework 
could be applied to other areas of law as well. 
We might think of the possibilities for voter duties along a 
spectrum: 
 
(1) No Duty: The voter is free to act in his or her own self-   
interest regardless of the consequences to others.  
 
(2) Kaldor-Hicks: The voter must act in the best interests of  
the collective, regardless of how the benefits and burdens 
are distributed. 
 
(3) Pareto: The voter may act in his or her own interest, but  
must refrain from harming the minority. 
 
(4) True Loyalty: The voter must subordinate his or her own  
interests to those of the minority. 
 
The spectrum is shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Potential Voter Duties Spectrum 
1. No Duty.  At the purely liberal end of the spectrum, voters bear 
no duties to others. They are free to act in their own self-interest 
without regard to the consequences that a vote may have upon others. 
Courts, accordingly, would take a hands-off approach with respect to 
the actions of the majority, recognizing their right to selfish ownership. 
Minority investors must protect themselves ex ante through 
contractual provisions, and courts will not step in to save them if they 
fail to bargain for sufficient protections. 
Despite academic calls to respect private ordering,95 as the 
examples discussed above demonstrate, courts have shown some 
 
 95. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 243–52 (1991).  
No Duty Kaldor-Hicks Pareto True Loyalty 
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reluctance to take a hands-off approach when majorities use their 
superior voting power to take advantage of minorities.96 
Corporate law comes closest to this no-duty pole in the context of 
publicly traded corporations, where exit is easy. In a publicly traded 
corporation, dissatisfied minority shareholders can readily sell their 
shares on the market, and thus have the ability to protect themselves. 
And the threat of exit acts as an alternative governance mechanism for 
disciplining the majority (which is often sensitive to the market price 
for stock).97 For this reason, courts are typically more deferential to 
what might look like opportunistic actions by the majority when the 
minority can easily protect itself through exit.98 Thus in publicly traded 
corporations, most states do not afford the minority appraisal rights or 
impose duties as strict as those borne by majority shareholders in 
closely held corporations, where there is no market for minority 
shares.99 
Some scholars have argued for a more hands-off approach even in 
closely held corporations, where exit is much more difficult.100 They 
argue that minority investors who fail to contract for protections, like 
dissolution provisions, may be trying to signal that they will not engage 
in opportunistic behavior by, for example, threatening to block 
beneficial corporate actions unless they are given a disproportionate 
 
 96. See supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text. 
 97. See, e.g., MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[A] n.13 (“In a publicly held 
corporation, the presence of a well-functioning market also exerts some discipline on those in 
control.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management 
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1196 (1981) (identifying the threat of 
exit as “the most powerful check on agency costs”); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965). See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 62 
(describing exit as one important lever of governance). 
 98. Mendel v. Carroll is an interesting example, in which a controlling shareholder of a 
publicly traded company proposed a freezeout merger to cash out the minority shares. Mendel v. 
Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 298–99 (Del. Ch. 1994). When a third party made a competing offer for two 
dollars more per share, the controlling shareholder withdrew its merger proposal and announced 
that it had no interest in selling to the third party, effectively killing the deal and preventing the 
minority from selling at a premium. Id. at 300–02. The court held that the controlling shareholder 
had no duty to facilitate the sale. Id. at 306. In other words, the controlling shareholder was free 
to selfishly deny the corporation a benefit, so long as it did not disproportionately hurt the 
minority shareholders. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, There Is No Affirmative Action for Minorities, 
Shareholder and Otherwise, in Corporate Law, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 71, 75 (2008). 
 99. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002); MOLL & 
RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[A], [D][1][a]–[b].  
 100. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 95, at 243–52 (highlighting several faults with 
the position that strict fiduciary standards, which are fundamental principles of partnership law, 
should be applied to closely held corporations); Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra 
note 87, at 301. 
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share of the profits.101 The parties are thus precommitting that they will 
not withdraw their capital at a time when the corporation might be 
vulnerable. But courts in most states require more of the majority in 
closely held corporations.102 Even where the corporate charter is silent, 
the default rule is an implicit delegation to courts of at least some 
power to police for majority opportunism.103 
2. Kaldor-Hicks-Style Duty.  The next point on the spectrum of 
potential voter duties, which I am calling Kaldor-Hicks, would require 
voters to act in the best interests of the collective, regardless of how the 
benefits and burdens are distributed.104 Whatever duty the voters bear 
runs to the collective organization, not to other voters. In other words, 
the majority would be allowed to impose costs on the minority, as long 
as doing so would benefit the collective as a whole. 
The classic case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,105 comes 
close to the Kaldor-Hicks approach. The court held that the majority 
shareholders had breached their duty to a minority shareholder by 
removing him from the payroll of a closely held corporation. Because 
there was no market for his shares and the corporation distributed all 
of its profits through salaries to its shareholder-employees, not through 
dividends, this effectively cut the minority shareholder out of any 
economic benefit of ownership. 
The court in Wilkes recognized that the majority’s duty to the 
minority must be balanced against its right to “‘selfish ownership’ in 
the corporation,” permitting it “room to maneuver” and “a large 
 
 101. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 87, at 287. 
 102. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[D][1][a]–[b]. It is worth noting that 
Delaware does not impose any sort of heightened duty on majority shareholders in closely held 
corporations. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380–81 (Del. 1993); Blaustein v. Lord 
Baltimore Capital Corp., C.A. No. 6685–VCN, 2013 WL 1810956, at *14 nn.83–84 (Del. Ch. 
Apr. 30, 2013), aff’d 84 A.3d 954 (Del. 2014). This is, perhaps, because Delaware has no interest 
in attracting closely held corporations and does not want these sorts of duties to pollute its law 
governing public corporations, which it very actively tries to attract. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud 
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 724–26 (2002) 
(acknowledging Delaware’s corporate-law dominance amongst the states and its economic 
interest in maintaining the status quo). 
 103. See Coffee, supra note 23, at 1620.  
 104. I draw this label from the economic concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A change in the 
state of affairs is said to be a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the people who benefit from the 
change could hypothetically compensate those who are made worse off; in other words, it does 
more good than harm in the aggregate. But no actual compensation is required, so some people 
can be left worse off, so long as the welfare of the group as a whole improves. See 2 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 417 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  
 105. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
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measure of discretion” in making decisions for the company.106 The 
court went on to explain that the majority could vote to disadvantage 
the minority in pursuit of a “legitimate business purpose” (that is, 
something reasonably calculated to benefit the corporation as a whole) 
that could not practicably be accomplished through means less harmful 
to the minority.107 There simply was no legitimate business purpose for 
terminating the minority shareholder on the facts of this case—the 
majority fired him because of a personal falling out. Wilkes, and the 
cases that have followed it,108 thus placed primary emphasis on the 
reasonableness of the majority’s conduct with respect to the 
corporation as a whole rather than its effect on the minority.109 
But Wilkes, and corporate law more generally, do not fully 
embrace the Kaldor-Hicks approach because they are never 
completely indifferent to the distribution of benefits and burdens. A 
fundamental principle of corporate law is that any distribution of 
profits to shareholders must be pro rata.110 Thus, even under the Wilkes 
approach where the majority’s duty would not prevent it from harming 
the minority, it can never deny the minority shareholders their 
proportional share of distributed profits. The majority cannot go below 
this pro rata floor created by the minority’s mere status as a 
 
 106. Id. at 663–64. 
 107. Id.  
 108. See, e.g., McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824, 832 (Idaho 2012) (“[I]t is possible for courts 
to find [legitimate uses of corporate power] harmful if the end result could have been achieved 
with less injury to the minority shareholder.”); G&N Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 242 
(Ind. 2001) (“If this was done for legitimate business reasons, it is protected by the business 
judgment rule.”); Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 653 (Md. 1985) (citing with 
approval the reasoning in Wilkes); Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (citing 
Wilkes’s “selfish ownership” principle while upholding the lower court’s ruling that the majority 
shareholders breached a fiduciary duty in a “freeze-out” of the president); Daniels v. Thomas, 
Dean, & Hoskins, Inc., 804 P.2d 359, 366 (Mont. 1990) (“[T]he controlling group should not be 
stymied by a minority stockholder’s grievances if the controlling group can demonstrate a 
legitimate business purpose and the minority stockholder cannot demonstrate a less harmful 
alternative.”); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) (holding that a breach of the 
fiduciary duty by majority shareholders, “absent a legitimate business purpose, is actionable”); 
Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 256 n.8 (R.I. 1996); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 
650 (Tenn. 1997). 
 109. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered 
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 762–63 (2000); see also MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra 
note 69, § 7.01[D][1][c] (discussing majority versus minority perspectives of oppression). 
 110. See, e.g., Twenty Seven Tr. v. Realty Growth Inv’rs, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (D. Md. 
1982). Different classes of stock, of course, might be entitled to different distributions, but here I 
am only talking about common stockholders, who are the residual claimants of the corporation 
and the ones typically endowed with voting rights. 
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shareholder, even if doing so would benefit the corporation as a 
whole.111 
One additional feature of Wilkes also deviated from a pure 
Kaldor-Hicks approach. Wilkes appeared to require the majority to 
minimize the harm to the minority. When taking actions that would 
harm the minority’s interests, the majority must show that there are no 
practicable alternatives that would achieve the same business purposes 
while doing less harm to the minority.112 
A pure Kaldor-Hicks style duty would require voters in the 
majority to attempt to maximize collective gains for the corporate 
venture regardless of how the benefits and burdens are distributed. But 
corporate law places a limit on the extent to which majority 
shareholders can impose costs on the minority for the benefit of the 
corporation. Although the majority can impose burdens on the 
minority for legitimate business purposes up to a point, it must afford 
the minority its pro rata shares of distributed profits. 
3. Pareto-Style Duty.  Further along the spectrum is what I am 
calling a Pareto-style duty, which would generally allow voters to act in 
their own interests, but would require them to refrain from harming 
the minority.113 The majority would not have to put the minority’s 
interests ahead of its own and vote to disadvantage itself to benefit the 
minority like a true fiduciary duty of loyalty would require, but neither 
could it harm the minority just because doing so would benefit the 
collective more. 
Another classic, In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,114 appears to take the 
Pareto approach. There, the majority shareholders in a closely held 
corporation ceased paying de facto dividends (in the form of “bonuses” 
paid in proportion to the number of shares held) to two shareholders 
after they stopped working for the company.115 The court held that the 
majority shareholders breached their duties (allowing the minority to 
 
 111. See, e.g., Gimpel v. Bolstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1022–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding 
that majority shareholders were justified in firing a minority shareholder who was embezzling 
money from a corporation, but that they had to “either alter the corporate financial structure so 
as to commence payment of dividends, or else make a reasonable offer to buy out [his] interest”).  
 112. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
 113. I draw this label from the economic concept of Pareto efficiency. A change in the state 
of affairs is said to be a Pareto improvement if it leaves at least one person better off without 
making anyone worse off. See 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 6–9 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).  
 114. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). 
 115. Id. at 1176. 
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force an involuntary dissolution for oppression) by frustrating the 
minority shareholders’ “reasonable expectations” about what they 
would receive for committing their capital to a closely held 
corporation.116 Unlike the Kaldor-Hicks approach in Wilkes, which 
primarily asked about the effects on the corporation as a whole, the 
focus in Kemp was squarely on how the majority’s actions affected the 
minority.117 
A pure Pareto-style duty would prohibit the majority from using 
its voting power to harm the minority’s interests, even if doing so would 
further legitimate business purposes and benefit the corporation as a 
whole. Kemp itself may not have gone quite this far (and, indeed, the 
court backed off earlier cases that had embraced a purer version of the 
Pareto-style duty118). The court in Kemp emphasized that it is the 
minority’s reasonable expectations “objectively viewed” that matter.119 
The majority does not violate its duty simply because the minority’s 
 
 116. Id.; see also Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985) (“Oppressive 
conduct . . . can be . . . difficult to discern. We favor the view recently expressed by the New York 
Court of Appeals [in Kemp] . . . .”); Smith v. Leonard, 876 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Ark. 1994) (“We have 
not previously addressed either ‘oppression’ or ‘reasonable expectations’ . . . but [In re Kemp] . . 
. is instructive.”); Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., 832 N.W.2d 663, 674 (Iowa 2013) (holding the 
minority’s reasonable expectations as the touchstone of oppression analysis); In re Dissolution of 
Clever Innovations, Inc., 941 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“Oppression has been 
defined as conduct of a controlling shareholder that substantially defeats expectations that, 
viewed objectively, ‘were both reasonable under the circumstances and . . . central to the 
[oppressed shareholder’s] decision to join the venture.’” (quoting In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 
1179)); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388 n.3 (N.D. 1987) (noting that reasonable 
expectations was the test laid out by the legislature); Landstrom v. Shaver, 561 N.W.2d 1, 8 (S.D. 
1997) (balancing minority’s “reasonable expectations” against corporations’ business judgment); 
McLaughlin v. Schenk, 220 P.3d 146, 157 (Utah 2009) (“[T]he court must consider . . . whether or 
not a shareholder’s reasonable expectations were thwarted.”). 
 117. See MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01[D][1][c]; Moll, supra note 109, at 764–65. 
 118. In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that it was irrelevant 
whether the majority shareholders had good cause to fire an incompetent minority shareholder; 
they breached their duty if they frustrated the minority shareholder’s expectation that he would 
be employed by the corporation and share in profits distributed as salary); see Moll, supra note 
109, at 768 (noting that In re Kemp backs off this approach). Professor Douglas Moll explains that 
under the “pure minority perspective” in In re Topper, “[a]ny majority actions that harm [the 
minority’s] expectations—even actions justified by a legitimate business purpose—will trigger 
oppression liability.” Id. at 767. Along similar lines, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., the 
majority caused the corporation to offer to buy back the retiring founder’s stock at a favorable 
price, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the majority breached its fiduciary 
duty to the minority by failing to offer them an equal opportunity to sell their stock back at the 
same price. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 520 (Mass. 1975). The same court 
backed off this Pareto-style rule in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663–
64 (Mass. 1976). 
 119. In re Kemp, 473 N.E.2d at 1179. 
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“subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled.”120 
In any event, even under a purer conception of a Pareto-style duty, the 
majority need not subordinate its interests to those of the minority like 
a truly loyal fiduciary would. 
4. True Duty of Loyalty.  At the “true loyalty” end of the spectrum, 
voters in the majority would have to act for the exclusive benefit of 
those in the minority and subordinate their own interests. This form of 
duty is much more suited to the principal–agent situation, where the 
fiduciary acts on behalf of the beneficiary, than to the context of a 
group of principals deciding on a course of action through voting. 
Voting among principals is a way to identify and aggregate 
preferences.121 To require the majority to act for the exclusive benefit 
of the minority when an issue is put to a vote would deny the majority 
any right to selfish ownership and beg the question: Why hold a vote in 
the first place if the winning side will have to do what the losing side 
wants? Further, the classic legal tools of the fiduciary duty of loyalty—
its prophylactic prohibitions on self-dealing and conflicts of interest—
are not designed for this type of situation. A true-loyalty obligation 
would put voters in precisely the type of conundrum that fiduciary law 
tries to avoid: a position where they must balance their own interests 
against the beneficiary’s interests. 
It is hard to find private-law examples of a true-loyalty voter duty. 
As Professor Stephen Bainbridge has argued, there is no affirmative 
action in corporate law; voters in the majority generally need not 
subordinate their interests to those of the minority as a true fiduciary 
would.122 Even in partnerships, where the black-letter law is that 
partners are fiduciaries for other partners,123 the duty that partners owe 
each other, principal-to-principal, does not look like a true duty of 
 
 120. Id.  
 121. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law & Economics of 
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 120 (2012) (“The function of a voting procedure, 
for political and corporate entities, is to aggregate . . . preferences.”). 
 122. Bainbridge, supra note 98, at 75 (“[W]hile corporate law ensures that the majority may 
not benefit itself at the expense and to the exclusion of the minority, corporate law does not 
require the majority affirmatively to benefit the minority at its own expense.”); see also Deborah 
A. DeMott, Agency Principles and Large Block Shareholders, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 323 
(1997) (contrasting constraints that would apply to large block shareholders if they were agents 
for other shareholders with current doctrine in which no such duty exists).  
 123. E.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (describing the partner’s 
fiduciary duty as “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”). 
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loyalty: the majority need not subordinate its interests to the 
minority’s.124 
Other countries may come closer to this true-loyalty approach for 
voters. In the controversial case Gambotto v. WCP Ltd.,125 for example, 
the High Court of Australia held that the majority shareholders of a 
publicly held corporation could not cash out the minority’s shares 
(even at a premium) except to avoid significant detriment or harm to 
the company.126 This approach goes beyond a Pareto-style duty; it 
appears to empower the minority to not only block actions that might 
benefit the corporation, but even to impose costs on the corporation—
up to the point of “significant detriment.”127 But it is inconsistent with 
the approach taken by U.S. corporate law.128 
5. Summary.  Although some cases refer to shareholders’ right to 
vote selfishly and others to the “fiduciary” obligations of majority 
shareholders, voter duties tend not to fall at either the no-duty or true-
loyalty poles. Instead, corporate-law voter duties tend to fall mostly in 
the Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto categories—or somewhere in between (as 
illustrated in Figure 2). 
 
 124. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, supra note 73, § 404(e) cmt. 5. As the comment to § 404(e) 
explains: 
[T]he partner’s rights as an owner and principal in the enterprise . . . must always be 
balanced against his duties and obligations as an agent and fiduciary. For example, a 
partner who, with consent, owns a shopping center may . . . legitimately vote against a 
proposal by the partnership to open a competing shopping center.  
Id.; see also Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 
1992) (holding that although a fiduciary relationship gives rise to a duty to “deal fairly,” it does 
not require the party to place the interest of the other party above her own). 
 125. Gambotto v WCP Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 432 (Austl.). 
 126. Id. at 459–60. 
 127. See Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39, 65 
(2000). 
 128. See id. at 41. 
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Figure 2: Voter Duty Spectrum with Examples 
At first glance it might seem like investors would insist on at least 
a Pareto-style voting duty before they surrender their autonomy and 
commit their capital to a venture. Otherwise they leave themselves 
open to unfavorable treatment in the event that they find themselves 
outvoted. But shareholders might rationally accept something closer to 
a Kaldor-Hicks-style voting duty with a pro rata floor under conditions 
of uncertainty.129 They might prefer the majority to direct its efforts 
towards maximizing the value of the corporation rather than ensuring 
that no individual shareholders are left worse off if they do not know 
whether they will be in the majority or minority on any given issue, 
their proportional shares of the expected gains from such efforts are 
great, or both. 
It is quite plausible that a Kaldor-Hicks-style duty could lead to 
significant collective gains over a Pareto-style duty. A pure Pareto-
style voter duty running to all other shareholders could saddle the 
corporation with counterproductive pet projects of minority 
shareholders and potentially lead to paralysis. For example, the 
majority would violate a pure Pareto-style duty by firing even a clearly 
incompetent minority shareholder employed by the corporation.130 It 
is not difficult to see how such a duty could undercut productivity. (A 
true duty of loyalty, of course, raises even more difficulties.131) 
But a pure Kaldor-Hicks-style duty does too little to protect the 
minority for investors to be likely to agree to it ex ante—particularly 
 
 129. See Gillette, supra note 54, at 629; supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text; Clayton 
P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law, 80 VA. L. 
REV. 625, 629 (1994). 
 130. See supra note 118. 
 131. See supra Part II.B.4. 
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where exit is difficult, as it is in a closely held corporation.132 Under a 
pure Kaldor-Hicks-style duty, the majority could simply expropriate 
the minority’s share of the profits, so long as it led to some benefit for 
the corporation as a whole. Thus investors’ willingness to gamble on 
the chance of greater gains from a duty running primarily to the 
collective instead of the minority depends, at a minimum, on the 
guarantee of a pro rata distribution. They need at least some backstop 
against exploitation.133 
A pro rata guarantee standing alone, however, is not enough. 
Even with a pro rata guarantee, investors would be unlikely to agree to 
a rule allowing the majority to vote benefits to itself at the expense of 
the corporation as a whole; that is, they would be unlikely to accept the 
hands-off, no-duty approach. Such a rule would leave them vulnerable 
to exploitation, as the majority could capture all of the private gain of 
looting the corporation, leaving the dispossessed minority only the cold 
comfort of knowing that the majority shared the resulting corporate 
losses pro rata. 
It is not always clear what is in the best interests of the 
corporation, and courts are not necessarily the best institutions to 
figure that out.134 As a result, courts tend not to second-guess business 
judgments arrived at through the ordinary governance mechanisms of 
the corporation.135 But the business judgment rule is not a license for 
exploitation. And courts continue to play an essential role in policing 
for opportunistic abuses of corporate collective-choice mechanisms 
 
 132. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, 
and Dastardly Deeds in the Close Corporation, 54 DUKE L.J. 293, 296 (2004) (explaining the 
difficulty of liquidating close-corporation shares because there is not a “ready market”). 
 133. Professors J.A.C. Hetherington and Michael Dooley define “exploitation” as the 
following: “[O]ne shareholder exploits another when he uses his position to capture a significant 
portion of the other’s ‘share’ of the firm’s income and profits; the other’s share may be defined as 
the portion of income and profits the parties would agree, through arms-length negotiation, 
belonged to that shareholder.” J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and 
Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 4 (1977). 
 134. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986); 
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001 (N.Y. 1979); cf. Rave, supra note 13, at 673 (noting 
the similar problem of institutional competence in constitutional law). 
 135. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 20 (Del. 2002) (“[A]bsent an abuse of discretion, 
[business judgment] will be respected by the courts.” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
812 (Del. 1984))); Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000; D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business 
Judgment Rule 3 (BYU Law Research Paper Series, No. 15-09, 2015), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2620536 [https://perma.cc/H2JJ-2SAN]. 
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and making sure that all parties act in good faith.136 Even if investors 
may not always demand Pareto-style protections, without the 
assurance that courts will require the majority to have at least a 
rational, good-faith explanation for how its actions benefit the 
collective and a promise that profits will be distributed pro rata, 
investors are unlikely to contribute their capital to ventures governed 
by majority rule—at least not without extensive (and costly) ex ante 
contractual protections. 
III.  FIDUCIARY VOTERS IN PUBLIC LAW? 
Why do we decide things by voting? Well, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, it is the least bad of a bunch of lousy options.137 Organizing 
a political society runs into the same problem of collective action as 
forming a business organization. As Hobbes explained, in a world 
where each person has complete autonomy, cooperation in pursuit of 
joint gains is nearly impossible; any individual can threaten to hold 
out.138 The solution is also the same. In order to realize the gains from 
cooperation, individuals—whether investors or citizens—must 
surrender their autonomy to some institution empowered to make 
collective decisions for the group (and to cram them down over the 
objection of holdouts). Majority rule, as Professor Adam Przeworski 
explained, works well as that collective-choice institution because the 
outcome of a vote is a reasonable proxy for the result of a violent 
struggle, should it come to that.139 
Of course, majority rule leaves the minority vulnerable. But so 
long as the minority has a realistic hope of joining a ruling coalition in 
the future and some assurance that by surrendering its autonomy it has 
not left itself open to exploitation at the hands of the majority or the 
newly empowered ruling class, it will be content to go along until the 
next cycle.140 Thus providing institutional responses to these risks 
(competitive elections, repeat play, structural minority protections, 
independent judicial review, etc.) is essential to getting the minority to 
buy into either a business or political venture. 
 
 136. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621, 1681. 
 137. 444 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1947) col. 207 (UK) (“[D]emocracy is the worst form of 
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”).  
 138. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651). 
 139. Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY’S 
VALUE 23, 23–55 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).  
 140. See id. at 31–39. 
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Given their similarities at the most fundamental level, looking at 
private-law approaches to governance problems can be illuminating for 
problems in constitutional law, as there is often an actual social 
contract instead of just a hypothetical one. Operating a collective 
business venture presents the same governance challenges that 
Madison identified in a democracy: checking self-dealing agents and 
preventing the tyranny of the majority. The legal and institutional 
responses to these problems in contexts where investors must sign on 
through consensual transactions can shed light on strategies for dealing 
with similar challenges in the public sphere where actual consent is not 
possible. 
The translation is not perfect, to be sure. There are strong 
equitable norms running through private law and relatively clear rules 
on how joint gains should be distributed.141 Constitutional law, by 
contrast, has only a less clearly defined equal protection norm.142 And 
there is far more consensus that the goal of private business 
organizations is wealth maximization than there will ever be on what 
counts as the “public interest.” 
Still, the fundamental problems of collective action are quite 
similar. And examining areas where the private law imposes duties on 
voters may help us understand the intuition behind the Supreme 
Court’s sometimes puzzling approach to equal protection in direct 
democracy. It may also help provide guidance for future decisions. 
A. The Analogy 
The duties that corporate law imposes on majority shareholders in 
closely held corporations may be particularly useful models for 
analyzing direct democracy. The more obvious analogue for 
representative democracy might be a publicly traded corporation, with 
its centralized management and large and diffuse body of 
shareholders.143 But several features of direct democracy make it look 
more like a closely held corporation, even though there are far more 
 
 141. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119, 
125–27 (2003) (highlighting corporate law’s concern that “insiders [not] simply maximize 
shareholder wealth, but that they must do so equitably”). 
 142. See id. at 179. 
 143. See Rave, supra note 13, at 708 (drawing the analogy between legislators and directors 
in public corporations); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 98, at 73 (“[T]he analogy between close 
corporations and the body politic seems weak, at best . . . . [T]he body politic most closely 
resembles the public corporation . . . .”). 
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voters in the typical ballot initiative than the typical closely held 
corporation. 
First, the difficulty of exit in the political process can make voting 
scenarios look more like closely held corporations, where there is 
typically no market for shares, than publicly traded corporations, 
where the market is robust. The costs of picking up and moving out of 
a jurisdiction can be high and even prohibitive for some.144 
Second, direct democracy lacks the intermediation of elected 
agents with duties to represent the political unit as a whole.145 It is the 
principals themselves who vote in a plebiscite. Similarly, in closely held 
corporations the shareholders themselves are typically also the 
directors (or at least dominate the board).146 Thus it is the relationships 
among the shareholders that really matter, not the relationship 
between the shareholders and intermediaries like directors (as is the 
case in publicly traded corporations where ownership and control are 
separated). 
And third, the lack of repeat play in direct democracy leaves 
minorities particularly vulnerable in a way that they are not in either 
representative democracy or a public corporation.147 Indeed, without 
repeat play, minorities may be even more vulnerable in direct 
democracy than in closely held corporations, though many corporate 
oppression cases arise at the end of the parties’ relationship, when the 
majority has no intention of “playing” with the minority in the future. 
There are obviously dissimilarities as well (the size of the body and 
the cohesiveness of their interests, to name a few). But still, the analogy 
may be able to tell us something useful about the strategies that the law 
has found to address situations where collective action is desirable, but 
interests diverge. A duty of fair dealing running from the majority to 
the minority might be at least a partial substitute for the structural 
protections that direct democracy lacks. On the view that the minority 
would not willingly leave itself so vulnerable in the hypothetical social 
contract, the lack of structural protections might trigger such a duty on 
the part of voters in the majority. 
 
 144. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 463 (5th Cir. 2000); MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, 
§ 2.01[A][2]. 
 147. See supra notes 54–55. 
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B. Voter Duties Clarify Equal Protection Review of Direct 
Democracy 
One way to understand the intuition behind equal protection 
doctrine in this area is to think of the Supreme Court as applying a duty 
running from the majority to the minority when it reviews the output 
of direct democracy. Despite its statement in Hollingsworth v. Perry 
that voters have no “fiduciary obligation,”148 the Court appears 
unwilling to take the completely hands-off view that direct-democracy 
voters have no duties and can vote in their narrow self-interest. So it 
steps in to police for opportunism. 
Indeed, in several cases, the Court has stepped in when the 
majority used a ballot initiative to exploit a minority. In Reitman v. 
Mulkey149 and Hunter v. Erickson,150 for example, the Court struck 
down the results of ballot initiatives that targeted racial minorities by 
rolling back antidiscrimination statutes and making it harder to enact 
antidiscrimination legislation in the future.151 And in Romer v. Evans, 
the Court struck down a state constitutional amendment passed by 
ballot initiative that targeted gay people by barring any claims of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.152 
None of these cases is easily explained by traditional equal 
protection analysis. Reitman pushed the state-action doctrine into 
questionable territory by finding that the state “encouraged” private 
racial discrimination by repealing a fair-housing law, and it is hard to 
reconcile with later cases.153 Hunter relied on a “political process” 
doctrine—that a state violates equal protection when it shifts 
policymaking authority on a racial issue to a different level of 
government where it is harder for racial minorities to win—which the 
Court later disavowed.154 And Romer refused to treat sexual 
 
 148. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2666–67 (2013). 
 149. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).  
 150. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 151. Id. at 393; Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381. 
 152. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). 
 153. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1006–12 (1982) (holding that state regulation and 
funding did not convert a private nursing home into a state actor); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830, 840–43 (1982) (holding that a private school’s public function and state funding did not 
make it a state actor). 
 154. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1634–37 (2014) (plurality 
opinion) (rejecting political-process doctrine and reinterpreting Hunter). 
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orientation as a suspect classification yet still applied a heightened 
form of rational-basis review to strike down the law.155 
But what these three cases have in common is the fact that they all 
involved instances where a majority of the voters used a ballot initiative 
to roll back protections that minority groups had won through the 
legislative process. Justice Douglas recognized as much in his 
concurrence in Reitman, where he stressed the danger that direct 
democracy poses to minorities, citing James Madison.156 
In this sense, the Court is playing the same institutional role in 
reviewing the output of direct democracy that courts play in corporate 
law: policing for opportunism. And constitutional law presents many 
of the same institutional tradeoffs as corporate law. Courts are not 
likely to be any better at figuring out what is in the public interest than 
they are at making business judgments.157 As Judge Hand said, “[I]t 
would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians.”158 
So we try to design institutions that will be better at making collective 
choices and to adopt governance structures that will be self-correcting. 
When they work, those institutions get a lot of leeway to exercise 
discretion.159 We also try to specify in advance some limitations on what 
the majority can do through those institutions, and so, for example, the 
Constitution includes a Bill of Rights. 
But the costs of specificity are high, so, as in corporate law, we end 
up delegating some power to the courts to police for opportunism after 
the fact. And the risk of opportunism is greatest where the structural 
protections for minorities are weakest. Thus we allow states to 
experiment with direct democracy, despite the Republican Guarantee 
 
 155. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630–36. 
 156. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 387 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“‘Wherever the real power in a 
Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the 
majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not 
from acts of government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the 
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.’” (quoting 5 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904))). 
 157. See Rave, supra note 13, at 694–95; Rave, supra note 91, at 1–2. 
 158. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
 159. This is, of course, the justification in Carolene Products for the presumption of 
constitutionality and deferential rational-basis review of the output of a well-functioning political 
process. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); see also Fred O. Smith, 
Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 584 (2014) 
(arguing that “well-ordered republican process is due process” and thus exempt from judicial 
scrutiny but that the same may not hold true of direct democracy). 
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Clause160 and the Framers’ skepticism toward the institution,161 only 
because we have the safety valve of ex post judicial review. Courts 
intuitively know that they have to rein in the excesses of direct 
democracy for the same reasons they have to check shareholder 
majorities. 
So what kind of duty is the Court applying to direct-democracy 
voters? It does not appear to be a true fiduciary duty of loyalty. The 
Court does not require the majority to subordinate its interests to those 
of the minority. This much is clear from its decision in Schuette to 
uphold the Michigan ballot initiative banning affirmative action.162 
Affirmative action—at least in the plurality’s view—extended a benefit 
to the minority at the majority’s expense. And the Court refused to 
step in when the majority decided to take that benefit away.163 
The duty that the Court applied appears to be one of 
antiexploitation—the majority must deal fairly and equitably with the 
minority but need not subordinate its own interests. But where on the 
spectrum of potential voter duties does this duty fall? Do majority 
voters owe a duty not to impose any burdens on the minority (Pareto)? 
Or just a duty not to impose burdens on the minority for no reason, 
that is, unless it is reasonably calculated to benefit the public as a whole 
(Kaldor-Hicks)? The answer is not entirely clear. 
Schuette might have come out differently if the majority voters had 
borne a Pareto-style duty to refrain from harming the minority, but it 
would have depended on the baseline. Affording admissions 
preferences to racial minorities might reasonably be viewed as the 
majority subordinating its interests to the minority’s and extending a 
benefit to the minority at its own expense—something a Pareto-style 
 
 160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 149–51 
(1912) (stating that whether citizen lawmaking qualifies as a “republican form of government” is 
a nonjusticiable political question); see also Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not 
“Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 31 (1993) 
(arguing that some exercises of citizen lawmaking can violate the Republican Guarantee Clause). 
But see Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the 
Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 814 (2002) (arguing on originalist grounds 
that “[c]itizen lawmaking as practiced in the United States today does not violate the Guarantee 
Clause”).  
 161. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 61 (James Madison). 
 162. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 163. Id. 
RAVE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/26/2016  10:16 PM 
368 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:331 
duty would not require.164 But once that benefit is extended, the 
baseline shifts and taking it away hurts the minority, which voters 
would not be allowed to do under a Pareto-style duty. Justice 
Sotomayor, in her dissent, took this Pareto view with existing 
affirmative-action programs as the baseline. But the Court rejected 
it.165 
The baseline’s importance can be seen in the debate between 
Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor over whether the political-process 
doctrine ossifies the preexisting allocation of decisionmaking authority 
over racial issues.166 Sotomayor viewed the majority as using a 
majoritarian tool to take something away from the minority and make 
it difficult for it to win back in the future; to reinstate affirmative action, 
they would have to amend the Michigan constitution.167 This violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment, according to Sotomayor, because it 
“alter[ed] the political process in a manner that uniquely burdened 
racial minorities’ ability to achieve their goals through that process.”168 
Scalia protested that this approach would lock in the status quo and 
prevent the majority from using a ballot initiative to undo earlier 
legislative capture by a powerful rent-seeking minority.169 The Justices 
 
 164. Set aside the debates over whether affirmative action actually benefits minorities and 
whether it is needed to remedy past harms. Compare id. at 1675–83 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that “race matters,” that affirmative action is necessary to address persistent inequality, 
and that eliminating it hurts minority students), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that affirmative action “stamp[s] 
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies”). 
 165. The Court came much closer to embracing a Pareto approach in Washington v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, which struck down a ballot initiative that rolled back a voluntary busing 
scheme aimed at combating de facto segregation. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 
457, 470 (1982). But the Court’s ambivalence toward the result in Seattle School is evident in its 
decision in Schuette. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1633 (plurality opinion). 
 166. Compare Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contrasting the process of 
amending Michigan’s constitution with electing a preferred university governing board), with id. 
at 1662–63, 1673–74 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that minorities would face an uphill 
battle in amending Michigan’s constitution). The baseline is always a problem with a Pareto 
approach. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 156 
(1970). 
 167. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1662–63 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 1659. 
 169. Id. at 1646 (Scalia, J., concurring); accord id. at 1636 (plurality opinion). Scalia took a 
similar position in his dissent in Romer v. Evans, where he argued that the powerful “homosexual” 
lobby had captured local governments and, under the logic of Federalist 10, only a statewide ballot 
initiative could overcome those local factions. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644–47 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia did not fully embrace the Madisonian position, however, as he 
admitted that statewide elected officials were sympathetic, and it was only an appeal to the people 
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were talking past each other in part because Sotomayor focused on 
how hard it is for minorities (and how easy it is for the majority) to win 
in direct democracy, while Scalia focused on how hard it is for the 
majority (and how easy it is for cohesive minorities) to win in 
representative democracy.170 
This debate also reveals a difficulty with a Pareto-style voter duty: 
it arguably gives the majority a claim when the minority uses structural 
protections (like supermajority voting rules or other veto points) to 
block actions supported by the majority. Indeed, corporate law 
recognizes oppression claims brought by the majority against the 
minority, though they are rare.171 The potential for either the majority 
or minority to invoke a Pareto-style duty could lead to paralysis. And 
it could undermine the balance struck in the constitutional design 
between majoritarianism and minority protection. 
Further, a strict application of a Pareto-style duty might block 
voters from using a ballot initiative to adopt beneficial policies. 
Consider a progressive income-tax system. Even if high marginal tax 
rates could be shown to significantly benefit the public as a whole, they 
would hurt a minority (rich people). Now maybe direct democracy 
should not be used to set tax policy (Madison would certainly have 
been troubled by it), but equal protection doctrine has not gone so 
far.172 And, as noted above, it is quite plausible under a contractarian 
theory that individuals would not insist on a Pareto-style duty and 
would agree to a lesser duty under conditions of uncertainty.173 
So perhaps the Court’s direct-democracy cases are more 
consistent with a Kaldor-Hicks-style duty that would allow voters to 
 
themselves—the very sort of majority faction that Madison feared—that reversed policies 
favoring gay people. Id. at 646. 
 170. Compare Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1661–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
“[m]inority groups face an especially uphill battle” in amending the Michigan constitution, getting 
an amendment passed is “no small task,” and the “costs of qualifying for an amendment are 
significant”), with id. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “[a]mending the Constitution 
requires the approval of only ‘a majority of the electors voting on the question,’” but that voting 
in a favorable board of regents requires prevailing in a series of elections over different election 
cycles (quoting MICH. CONST., art. XII, § 2)).  
 171. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 803 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (holding 
that a minority shareholder who sought to avoid personal tax liability violated a duty to the 
majority by using a supermajority voting rule to block dividend distribution, which caused the 
corporation to incur a tax penalty). 
 172. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992) (upholding a property-tax scheme 
passed by ballot initiative that imposed a greater burden on recent land purchasers than on long-
term owners). 
 173. See supra notes 129–36 and accompanying text. 
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impose a burden on the minority so long as it is reasonably calculated 
to advance the interests of the polity as a whole. Romer could certainly 
be read in this manner. The Court found no rational basis for barring 
protections from sexual-orientation discrimination.174 It was not 
designed to further the public interest; the burden imposed on the 
minority was gratuitous. This approach might not be so different from 
the duty to vote in the public interest that Foley and Serota and Leib 
advocate, though it is obviously differently derived. 
But the equitable streak running through the private-law 
doctrines of voter duty would seem to require more. Even the most 
hands-off views of voter duties in corporate law do not allow the 
majority to deprive the minority of its pro rata share in the profits of 
the corporation.175 Proportional distribution is a floor beneath which 
the majority cannot go, even in pursuit of the corporation’s interests as 
a whole. Perhaps the public-law analogue to this floor is equal 
protection. Individuals’ status as persons guarantees them at least some 
backstop protection from oppression at the hands of the majority, just 
as shareholders’ status as shareholders guarantees that the majority 
cannot deny them their pro rata share of corporate profits. 
The majority obviously cannot use a ballot initiative to impose 
policies on the minority that violate equal protection. And the initiative 
in Schuette did not go below this floor. The affirmative-action policies 
that it rolled back were not constitutionally required (indeed the 
Roberts Court has treated affirmative action as barely constitutionally 
permissible).176 Justice Kennedy saw what the majority did not as 
imposing a special cost on the minority but rather as taking away a 
special benefit—a “grant of favored status.”177 If the minority had been 
getting more than its pro rata share in the first place through race-
based admissions preferences, taking away a benefit might violate a 
Pareto-style duty, but it would not go below a pro rata floor. Merely 
taking away an extra benefit would not violate a Kaldor-Hicks-style 
duty. 
But the bans on private discrimination at issue in Reitman, Hunter, 
and Romer were not constitutionally required either. The difference? 
 
 174. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–36 (1996); accord Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1086 (9th Cir. 
2012) (striking down California a ballot initiative banning same-sex marriage because it lacked a 
rational basis), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 175. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 176. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). 
 177. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1636–38 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
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Perhaps the Court was unwilling to believe that the majority was acting 
in good-faith pursuit of the collective good in rolling back 
antidiscrimination statutes. At best, in Reitman and Hunter, it was a 
selfish attempt to preserve property values in white neighborhoods; at 
worst, it was race hatred. And even if there were collective gains to be 
had from allowing private housing discrimination, the minority would 
not share in any of those gains and would bear the brunt of the costs. 
In Romer, likewise, the benefits were questionable and the burdens 
concentrated on the minority. In Schuette, by contrast, the Court was 
much more willing to believe that the majority acted in good-faith 
pursuit of the public interest. And the minority would share in what 
Justice Kennedy viewed as the collective benefits of doing away with 
affirmative action, with “its latent potential to become itself a source 
of the very resentments and hostilities based on race that this Nation 
seeks to put behind it.”178 So the initiative in Schuette satisfied a Kaldor-
Hicks-style duty, while those in Reitman, Hunter, and Romer did not. 
Teasing out where the “pro rata baseline” is and what counts as a 
special benefit or cost in any given case will inevitably be difficult and 
imprecise. But perhaps in constitutional law, as in corporate law, it is 
not the precise content of the substantive standard but rather the 
“institution of judicial oversight” that really matters.179 It may be 
enough to say that the duties of voters in direct democracy fall 
somewhere on the spectrum between Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks and to 
count on the courts to employ equitable judgments to root out 
opportunism after the fact on a case-by-case basis.180 
 
 178. Id. at 1638. Note that this result depends on Justice Kennedy’s view on the substantive 
merits of affirmative action. If one thinks that affirmative action is necessary to remedy the effects 
of past discrimination, then the burdens of eliminating it fall clearly on the minority, while the 
benefits redound primarily to the majority. If, on the other hand, one thinks that affirmative 
action is only justified by the educational benefits of diversity shared by all races, then the benefits 
and burdens of eliminating it are more evenly distributed among the majority and minority. This 
observation may help explain Justice Kennedy’s effective rewriting of Seattle School based on 
newly discovered evidence that the busing scheme eliminated by ballot initiative there may have 
been remedying prior de jure segregation. Id. at 1633. On this revised account, the busing was not 
aimed at diversifying neighborhood primary and secondary schools, the benefits and burden of 
which are shared by all; it was necessary to remedy past unconstitutional segregation. And the 
ballot initiative that put a stop to it hurt the minority. 
 179. Coffee, supra note 23, at 1621. 
 180. See Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 261, 264, 282 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) (explaining the 
importance of ex post flexibility). 
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C. Heightened Rationality Review for Direct Democracy 
If we think of the Supreme Court as applying a duty to direct-
democracy voters that falls somewhere in between Pareto and Kaldor-
Hicks, then the analogy to corporate law may support a form of 
heightened rationality review for the output of direct democracy. 
Recall that in Wilkes, where the court imposed a Kaldor-Hicks-
style duty, the voters’ duties ran primarily to the collective; the majority 
could pursue legitimate business purposes for the benefit of the 
corporation, even if they worked to the detriment of particular 
shareholders. But the majority also had a duty to minimize the harm to 
the minority. Thus if there were practicable alternative means to 
achieve the legitimate business purpose that would cause less harm to 
the minority, the majority had a duty to adopt them.181 
Although a similar voter duty applied in the public sphere would 
not demand strict scrutiny across the board—Wilkes does not call for a 
“compelling” purpose, just a “legitimate” one—its “least restrictive 
means” analysis would support a much greater degree of means-ends 
testing than is typically associated with rational-basis scrutiny.182 
Judicial review of whether the ends were legitimate would necessarily 
be limited and could not demand much more than a loose conception 
of how the measure furthers the public good. In Wilkes itself, the court 
stressed the “large measure of discretion” that majority shareholders 
have in determining the “business policy of the corporation.”183 And 
courts are not likely to be any better at determining what is in the 
public interest than in making business judgments.184 But it could 
demand more in terms of means-ends fit than the “anything goes” 
approach of standard rationality review; in other words, a sort of 
rational-basis-with-bite approach.185 
 
 181. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976); see also 
Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (following Wilkes and holding that the 
majority breached its duty in part because alternatives less harmful to the minority were 
available). 
 182. E.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). 
 183. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
 184. See Rave, supra note 13, at 723. 
 185. Cf. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (striking down as irrational 
an easement requirement that applied only to one property owner and not others similarly 
situated); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989) (applying 
rational basis with bite to strike down a tax assessment system that disfavored recent purchasers); 
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing 
that rational basis should have more teeth for equal protection than due process). 
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Romer, of course, is consistent with this view, though the Court 
was focused more on the illegitimacy of the ends (the ballot measure 
was motivated by animus) than the choice of means. The Supreme 
Court has not adopted an across-the-board rational-basis-with-bite 
approach to the outputs of direct democracy, but if we were to take this 
sort of voter duty seriously, perhaps it should.186 
This suggestion echoes Professor Julian Eule’s argument from 
more than twenty-five years ago that courts should give a “hard look” 
to laws passed through ballot initiatives.187 Eule argued that because 
many of the structural features that justify judicial deference to the 
legislative process under the United States v. Carolene Products Co.188 
footnote four framework—most notably, structural protections for 
minorities—are absent in direct democracy, courts should apply 
“heightened ends-means review” to its output.189 
The analogy to corporate law, however, adds several things. Eule’s 
argument for hard-look review of ballot initiatives has a sort of  
“I know it when I see it” quality.190 The corporate analogy tells us what 
“it” is: opportunism. And the analogy provides some additional 
theoretical grounding from an area of law that focuses intently on the 
problem of minority oppression.191 
Further, it casts courts in a familiar role, one they are comfortable 
playing in the private sphere across many contexts: policing for 
opportunism. And acknowledging that role may be more fruitful than 
focusing on discriminatory intent—the relentless search for a 
constitutional bad actor—as Justice Kennedy tried to do in 
reinterpreting Reitman, Hunter, and Seattle to be about targeting racial 
minorities because of their race. 
The content of corporate-law voter duties offers some limiting 
principles on what courts should be looking for when reviewing direct 
democracy for minority exploitation. The majority’s duty toward the 
 
 186. But see Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1992) (upholding under rational-basis 
scrutiny a property tax passed by ballot initiative that imposed disproportionate tax on more 
recent purchasers). 
 187. Eule, supra note 47, at 1558–73. 
 188. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 189. Eule, supra note 47, at 1568. 
 190. Id. at 1573 (“Sometimes a hard judicial look will take the form . . . of a candid ‘We know 
what’s going on here and we won’t allow any of it.’”). 
 191. Cf. Chander, supra note 141, at 119 (discussing how corporate law concerns itself with 
minority investors). See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 69, § 7.01 (discussing the 
oppression doctrine); F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS & LLC MEMBERS (2d ed. 2004) (same). 
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minority in corporate law does not deny the majority the right to vote 
in its own interests or say that the minority can never be harmed; it is 
not a true loyalty or pure Pareto-style duty. But it does require the 
majority to vote in pursuit of a good-faith conception of the collective 
good and, where possible, avoid visiting disproportionate harm on the 
minority. 
Finally, thinking about judicial protection of minorities in terms of 
voter duties may actually strengthen the primary governance 
mechanisms of direct democracy. If voters internalize the idea that they 
bear a duty to the minority and think about others’ interests when they 
vote, that may improve the preference-aggregation function of 
voting.192 If enough voters take this duty seriously, it could reduce the 
chances of minority exploitation in the first place. And aggregating 
voters’ opinions about their own other-regarding preferences may be 
better than having courts guess at what those preferences would be. 
To be clear, I am not advocating a duty that would be enforceable 
against individual voters in damages suits but rather for courts to play 
an institutional role that reacts to opportunism and exploitation, much 
like they police for opportunism in private law. And, in fact, courts 
already instinctively play this role in many cases reviewing the output 
of direct democracy, though they are not always clear about the 
intuition that is driving it. 
But just as we need more than mere status-based protections in 
closely held corporations because the ordinary protections for 
minorities (exit, intermediation, etc.) do not work in that context, we 
may need more than ordinary equal protection review in direct 
democracy where the structural protections for minorities (such as 
intermediation, veto points, repeat play, and logrolling) are absent. A 
rational-basis-with-bite test—one that requires a good-faith and 
plausible explanation for how a law that hurts some minority actually 
serves some legitimate public purpose—can serve as a vital 
institutional check on a governance process that is necessarily 
incomplete in its protection of minorities. 
 
 192. In this sense I am sympathetic to Foley and Serota and Leib’s projects, even if I disagree 
with their treatment of voters as representatives. See Foley, supra note 14, at 163; Serota & Leib, 
supra note 14, at 1601–02.  
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IV.  SOME POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND DISANALOGIES 
Some potential objections remain. First, looking to private law to 
derive equitable duties for voters in direct democracy does not answer 
the hard questions in equal protection law. It does not tell us how to 
define the “majority” and the “minority” or which sorts of 
classifications should be suspect. We still need the classic tools of equal 
protection theory, such as historical analysis and the Carolene Products 
footnote, to grapple with these questions. But it can perhaps help 
highlight areas where additional judicial scrutiny might be warranted 
because structural protections for minorities are inadequate. 
Second, and related to the definitional challenges, there is a 
substantial difference in the cohesiveness of majority and minority 
groups in private law and majority and minority groups in the public 
sphere. A shareholder majority, for example, can be a small group or 
even a single investor whose interests may be perfectly cohesive across 
all issues.193 When the majority is cohesive, the risk of minority 
oppression is acute. Coordination is simple and there is little internal 
discord standing in the way of action. The majority in the public sphere 
will almost always be larger, encompass more diverse interests across 
a much broader range of issues, and face a more significant collective-
action problem when imposing its will.194 After all, each person only 
gets one vote.195 And there may be nothing tying the members of the 
majority together except their coincidence of interests on a particular 
issue. Yet the majority must constitute itself and find a way to work 
together if it is to oppress the minority. 
A cohesive minority is also harder to define in the public sphere 
than in the private. Of course, a diffuse minority is also vulnerable to 
exploitation at the hands of the majority,196 though it may be more 
difficult to apply a duty running to the minority without being able to 
identify the relevant minority.197 And race or other characteristics that 
trigger irrational prejudices might motivate the majority itself to define 
 
 193. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 141, at 125 (noting that Henry Ford alone represented the 
shareholder majority in Ford Motor Company). 
 194. This is Madison’s central insight in Federalist 10’s “go bigger” strategy for controlling 
faction by expanding the size of the Republic to encompass more people and factions so that no 
single faction could make up a cohesive majority. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 29, at 
64 (James Madison). 
 195. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). 
 196. See Ackerman, supra note 55, at 723–24. 
 197. But see Miller & Gold, supra note 18, at 517–18 (arguing that fiduciary duties can be 
directed to purposes, not only people). 
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the relevant minority by treating individuals with those characteristics 
as a disfavored group. 
Still, there are reasons to believe that direct democracy in 
particular may produce cohesive majorities out of a large citizenry with 
diverse interests. Because ballot initiatives are limited to a single 
subject, they may allow the sort of cohesive faction that Madison so 
feared to come together, motivated by a shared passion on a single 
issue. And because the vote is a single-shot deal with secret ballots, the 
majority may feel little need to restrain itself in the hopes of building 
future coalitions on other issues where its members may be less 
cohesive.198 Although it may never be as cohesive as a single controlling 
shareholder, the majority in direct democracy may be cohesive enough 
to pose a real threat to the minority. 
Third, deriving voter-specific duties from corporate law can be 
risky business because the controlling shareholder is often also a 
director (or at least has control over the directors) and thus bears an 
independent source of fiduciary duty.199 It can thus be difficult in any 
given case to tease out which duties derive from being a voting 
shareholder (one of the principals) and which derive from being a 
director (an agent). But trying too hard to distinguish these duties may 
be elevating form over substance. The majority shareholder has control 
over the board of directors because it has the majority of the votes on 
all issues, including those that would require a direct shareholder vote, 
like a merger. Thus the important relationship is the principal-to-
principal relationship between the majority and minority shareholders, 
not the principal–agent relationship between the shareholders and the 
board. Further, the fact that other areas of private law impose similar 
equitable principal-to-principal duties on partners, bondholders, and 
oil and gas interest holders when they vote helps reinforce the notion 
that majority shareholder duties can be considered voter duties. 
CONCLUSION 
Voters are not fiduciaries in the classic sense. They do not 
represent anyone other than themselves; they are not agents and need 
not subordinate their own interests to any principal. But agency costs 
 
 198. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1555–56. 
 199. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255, 1269 (2008) (“[T]he degree to which a shareholder controls the board has become 
the judicial touchstone of shareholder fiduciary duty.”). 
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are only half the problem in a democracy and no problem at all in direct 
democracy. 
How to control the tyranny of the majority is a far more pressing 
concern for direct democracy. And public law has much to learn from 
the approaches that private law takes to similarly structured 
governance problems. The duties that private law places on voters and 
the role that courts play in policing for opportunism can help explain 
the Supreme Court’s sometimes erratic approach to direct democracy. 
The Court plays a familiar equitable role and steps in to protect 
minorities from exploitation at the hands of the majority where the 
structural protections for minorities are weakest. And applying similar 
duties to voters in the public sphere may suggest that the courts should 
take a more skeptical view toward ballot initiatives that affect 
minorities and subject them to a heightened form of rationality review. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona State Legislature 
v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission provides a nice 
counterpoint. There, the Court upheld Arizona voters’ use of a ballot 
initiative to take the power to draw state legislative and congressional 
districts out of the hands of state legislators and give it to an appointed 
commission.200 In dissent, Justice Thomas was puzzled by the majority’s 
“glowing” description of direct democracy and its “paean to the ballot 
initiative” when, as he pointed out, the Court has so often shown 
“disdain for state ballot initiatives” in the past.201 
But the majority was right. This was an example of “direct 
democracy at its best.”202 Unlike the examples that Thomas cited, the 
Arizona redistricting case did not involve a majority using a plebiscite 
to impose costs on, or withdraw a benefit from, a minority. Rather, it 
was an attempt by the majority to rein in the self-dealing activities of 
its agents—the legislators who were gerrymandering district lines to 
entrench themselves. Thus this case did not present the tyranny-of-the-
majority problem that we depend on courts to police in direct 
democracy; rather it shows how the presence of an alternative 
majoritarian institution can be a useful safety valve for the other 
 
 200. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 
(2015). 
 201. Id. at 2697 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 2698. 
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governance problem Madison identified in representative institutions: 
self-dealing agents.203 
 
 203. See Rave, supra note 13, at 686; accord Eule, supra note 47, at 1559–60 (noting that 
governmental reform through ballot initiative “pose[s] no distinctive threat of majoritarian 
tyranny”). Eule did add the proviso that he was skeptical of “reapportionment efforts” through 
direct democracy, which he said are often a “façade for disenfranchising minorities.” Id. at 1560. 
Here I part ways with Eule, as the primary alternative—leaving redistricting in the hands of self-
interested incumbents—strikes me as far worse. See Rave, supra note 13, at 678.  
